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THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND THE
ACCREDITATION OF INSTITUTIONS OF
HIGHER EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
Students across the country rely heavily on federal financial aid
when deciding to pursue a college degree. To obtain federal financial
aid funding, the Higher Education Act (the HEA) requires students
to attend accredited institutions.' The agencies that accredit colleges
and universities employ a complex process and rely on a vast number
of characteristics in evaluating institutions of higher education. The
volume of information that a school must provide creates a possibility
that an institution of higher education may either inadvertently or
willfully make misrepresentations to accreditation agencies in order to
maintain an accredited status.2 Recently, these types of misstatements
have opened the door for private citizens to sue these institutions on
behalf of the United States government, and the courts have been
quite willing to hear such claims.3
The federal False Claims Act (the FCA) was enacted to assist the
government in recovering losses sustained by fraudulent activity
against the government.4 The FCA creates liability for a party who
"knowingly presents, or causes to be presented to the government a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" or "knowingly
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent claim" paid by the government.5
"Knowingly" is defined in the statute as "actual knowledge," "deliber-
ate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information," or "reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information." 6
1. Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. H§ 1070-1099 (2006).
2. See Brief for American Council on Education et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appelleel
Cross-Appellant at 2-3, O'Connell v. Chapman Univ. (9th Cir. June 3, 2009) (No. 07-56864)
[hereinafter ACE Amicus Brief].
3. See United States ex ret. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2005); United States ex rel.
Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487 (S.D. Tex. 2003); United States v. Chapman
Univ., No. SACV 04-1256JVSRCX, 2006 WL 1562231 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2006); United States
ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln Technical Inst., Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV505K, 2003 WL 22474586 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 3, 2003).
4. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1-2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67.
5. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)-(2) (West 2009).
6. § 3729(b)(1)-(3).
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Generally, any organization or individual obtaining federal money
has the possibility of being charged as a defendant in an FCA "qui
tam" action.7 As it would be nearly impossible for the government to
uncover and prosecute all potential violations of the FCA, the statute
has a qui tam provision which allows a private party, known as a rela-
tor, to bring a lawsuit against a party who has defrauded the United
States government.8
To initiate an FCA suit, a qui tam relator files a complaint under
seal in a U.S. district court along with a written disclosure providing
the government with enough information to investigate the claim.9
While the complaint is under seal, the Department of Justice has the
option to join the lawsuit, decline to join the lawsuit, move to dismiss
the claim, or attempt to settle the claim.10 The Department of Justice
generally has sixty days to make its decision but may get an extension
under certain circumstances.' If the government declines to join in
the action with the relator who filed the suit, the relator maintains the
ability to investigate and prosecute the case.12 FCA qui tam actions
are very attractive to potential relators because a relator is entitled to
recover a portion of the settlement or money judgment recovered by
the government.13
In recent years, federal circuit courts have expanded the relators'
ability to bring qui tam actions against higher education institutions.
Furthermore, President Barack Obama signed the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act of 2009 into law on May 20, 2009, further ex-
panding the ability of private parties to bring qui tam actions.'4 Be-
cause of the potentially lucrative outcome, there will likely be a
drastic increase in FCA qui tam litigation against institutions of higher
education, specifically in the area of accreditation. The increased liti-
gation will result from the reduction in procedural hurdles to bring qui
tam actions coupled with the complex and fact-specific nature of the
accreditation process.
7. Who Is Charged, TiH Qui TAM INFo. CETEIsR, http://www.quitam.com/idl2.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2011).
8. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b).
9. See flow Qui Tam Works, THE Qui TAM INFo. CE-NTER, http://www.quitam.com/idl3.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See § 3730(d)(1)-(2). When the government intervenes in the action, a relator may re-
cover between 15% and 25%, and when the government elects not to intervene a relator may
recover between 25% and 30% of any amount recovered by the government. Id.
14. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617,1617-25
[hereinafter FERA].
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The increased litigation will defeat the overall purpose of the FCA,
which is to deter fraud against the government, because it will merely
create additional expenses for educational institutions, which will
likely be passed on to students in the form of higher tuition rates.
Higher tuition rates will require these students to take out a larger
amount of federal loans in order to cover the cost of tuition. In-
creased student debt burdens will increase the risk of default on loan
repayments, which will cause the government to lose money on these
loans. Hence, not only will educational institutions found to violate
the FCA suffer, but so will the innocent students and the government
itself, the very institution the Act was created to protect. Only rela-
tors will end up benefiting from the FCA actions, even though relators
are not the intended beneficiaries of the FCA.15
Part II explains the background of the federal False Claims Act as it
relates to educational institutions, and discusses (1) the various types
of federal funding that higher education institutions receive; (2) the
accreditation process for higher education institutions; (3) the devel-
oping case law relating to FCA qui tam actions against institutions of
higher education; and (4) the amendments made to the FCA that were
signed into law by President Obama in 2009, as well as the bills cur-
rently pending in Congress related to the FCA.16 Part III analyzes the
likely effect of recent case law and the FCA amendments on the ac-
creditation process for educational institutions and why the ultimate
result will not be in line with the goal of the FCA.17 Finally, Part IV
evaluates the increased litigation that will result and the correspond-
ing cost to universities that will be pushed down to students.' 8
II. BACKGROUND
The FCA was originally enacted in 1863 and has continually
evolved since that time. Section A discusses the history of the FCA.19
Section B discusses federal funding of institutions of higher educa-
tion.20 Section C discusses the accreditation process for institutions of
15. See Rachel Perkins, Note, Federal Funding and Fraud: The False Claims Act in Higher
Education After Main v. Oakland City University, 35 J.C. & U.L. 747, 747 (2009) ("The False
Claims Act (FCA) is a federal statute that aims to 'combat fraud against the federal govern-
ment."' (quoting Virginia C. Theis, Note, Government Employees as Qui Tam Plaintiffs: Sub-
verting the Purposes of the False Claims Act, 28 Pun. Ciarr. L.J. 225, 225 (1999))).
16. See infra notes 19-141 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 142-202 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 203-15 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
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higher education.21 Section D discusses the history of FCA actions
against higher education institutions.22 Section E discusses the 2009
amendments to the FCA.2 3 Finally, Section F discusses the bills cur-
rently pending in both the House and Senate and their potential effect
on the FCA if passed.2 4
A. History of the Federal False Claims Act
The FCA was enacted in 1863 by President Abraham Lincoln dur-
ing the Civil War to prevent private contractors from profiting off of
fraudulent sales to the government.25 Contractors were taking advan-
tage of the state of war by selling useless items to the government,
thus making a large profit from these sales.26 The FCA created crimi-
nal and civil penalties for anyone submitting a false claim for money
to the government.27 The FCA contained a "qui tam" provision,
which allowed private attorney generals (now referred to as relators)
to bring a private civil action on behalf of the United States govern-
ment against the party perpetrating the fraud.28 Qui tam is derived
from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in
hac parte sequitur," which means "who as well for the king as for him-
self sues in this matter." 2 9 The United States could choose whether to
intervene in the private civil action, but regardless, the private party
bringing the action was entitled to one half of the damages recovered
on the government's behalf.30
In 1943, Congress first amended the FCA in order to bar recovery
by a relator in cases in which the government had prior knowledge of
the allegations regardless of whether the relator was the original
source of the information. 3 1 Congress implemented this change in or-
der to prevent relators from bringing qui tam actions that were al-
ready disclosed to the government by copying the allegations from
publicly filed criminal cases.32 The amendments also reduced the eco-
21. See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 71-114 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
25. See Perkins, supra note 15, at 748-49.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 749.
28. See Roberto M. Braceras & Karin Bell, The False Claims Act and Universities: From
Fraud to Compliance, in CoujYGE AND UNIVERSrfY LAW MANUAL, at 8-1, 8-4 (Robert W. lu-
liano ed., 2009).
29. BLACK'S LAw DIciONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
30. Perkins, supra note 15, at 749.
31. Braceras & Bell, supra note 28, at 8-5.
32. See id.
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nomic incentive to bring qui tam actions by reducing the amount a
relator could recover from 50% to 25% if the government did not
intervene, and 10% if it did.33
It was not until 1986 that Congress again amended the FCA, this
time with the intent to make it easier for a relator to bring a qui tam
action.34 With these amendments, Congress allowed relators to bring
qui tam actions even if the government was previously aware of the
fraud as long as the relator was the "original source" of the informa-
tion, with "direct and independent knowledge" of the fraudulent ac-
tivity.3 5 Now under the statute, a violation of the FCA would result in
a civil penalty of $5,000 to $10,000, plus three times the amount of
damages that the government sustained due to the violation. 36 Addi-
tionally, the amendments increased the amount a relator could re-
cover to between 15% to 25% if the government chose to intervene,
and between 25% to 30% if it did not.3 7 After the 1986 amendments,
FCA claims dramatically increased, with qui tam relators having re-
covered over $2 billion since the 1986 amendments.38 Furthermore,
75% to 80% of FCA actions have been brought by qui tam relators
since 2000.39
B. Federal Funding of Higher Education Institutions
Under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, various fed-
eral loan programs are available to students.40 These programs in-
clude federal Pell Grants, 41 the federal Family Educational Loan
(FFEL) Program,42 the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Pro-
gram,43 and the federal Perkins Loan Program. 44
Federal Pell Grants do not need to be repaid to the government.45
The grants are awarded solely to undergraduate students, with the
33. Perkins, supra note 15, at 749.
34. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006)).
35. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (amended); see also Perkins, supra note 15, at 750.
36. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); § 2, 100 Stat. at 3153.
37. 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(1)-(2); see also Perkins, supra note 15, at 750.
38. Braceras & Bell, supra note 28, at 8-6.
39. Id.
40. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-1099 (2006).
41. § 1070a.
42. §§ 1071-1087.
43. § 1087a-1087j.
44. § 1087aa-1087ii.
45. Federal Pell Grant, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT oF EDUCAION: FEDERAL ST1UDE7NT
AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/PellGrants.jsp?tab=funding
(last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
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maximum award being $5,350 during the 2009-10 academic year.46
The federal Perkins Loan Program provides low-interest loans for un-
dergraduate and graduate students with exceptional financial need.47
The school is the lender for Perkins Loans, but the funds come from
the federal government.48 A student may borrow up to $5,550 per
year as an undergraduate student and $8,000 per year as a graduate
student.49
The FFEL Program and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program consist of Stafford Loans for students and PLUS Loans for
parents and graduate or professional degree students.50 The federal
government may subsidize Stafford Loans on the basis of a student's
need- the government pays the interest on the loan while the student
is in school.5' In addition to subsidized Stafford Loans, a student may
borrow unsubsidized Stafford Loans without demonstrating financial
need.52
In order for an institution to be eligible to receive federal student
funding, it must enter into a written Program Participation Agreement
(PPA) with the Secretary of the Department of Education.53 By sign-
ing the PPA, the institution agrees to comply "with all statutory provi-
sions of or applicable to Title IV of the [Higher Education Act (the
HEA)], all applicable regulatory provisions prescribed under that stat-
utory authority, and all applicable special arrangements, agreements,
and limitations entered into under the authority of the statutes appli-
cable to Title IV of the HEA . . . ."54 Institutions must also be accred-
ited or preaccredited in order to qualify for federal funding.55 Once
46. Completing the 2009-2010 FAFSA, UNIro STATIs DeirARTMENT oi- EoucAIoN: Fi-
ERAL STUDENr All, http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/publications/completing-fafsa/2009_2010/
fsa.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
47. Campus-Based Aid, UNITED SrATEs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: FiDERAL STUDENT
AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/campusaid.jsp (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Direct Stafford Loans, UNITED STA-TeS DEPARTMENT OF EoucAION: FEDERAL STUDENT
Aio, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/studentoans.jsp (last visited
Sept. 27, 2010). On July 1, 2010, the law changed so that private leaders may no longer make
loans under the FFEL Program. Id. All Stafford and PLUS loans now come directly from the
Federal Direct Loan Program. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(a)(1) (2008).
54. § 668.14(b)(1).
55. § 600.4(a)(5)(i). Accredited is defined as "[tihe status of public recognition that a nation-
ally recognized accrediting agency grants to an institution or educational program that meets the
agency's established requirements." § 600.2. Preaccredited is defined as "[a] status that a na-
tionally recognized accrediting agency, recognized by the Secretary to grant that status, has ac-
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an institution is qualified to receive federal funding, a student cur-
rently attending or planning to attend the school may apply to receive
funding via the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). 56
C. The Accreditation Process
Accrediting agencies are private regional or national associations
that "develop evaluation criteria and conduct peer evaluations to as-
sess whether or not those criteria are met."57 While the Department
of Education does not accredit educational institutions, the Secretary
of Education publishes a list of nationally recognized accreditation
agencies that the Secretary determines to be reliable.58 An accredita-
tion agency's role is to establish whether "an institution has clearly
defined appropriate objectives, whether it has established conditions
under which it can reasonably be expected to obtain them, and
whether it appears to be obtaining them." 59 The process of accredita-
tion is based on trust, standards, evidence, judgment, and peer re-
view.60 The process requires knowledge of appropriate curricula,
appropriate student-faculty ratios, adequacy of educational facilities,
faculty competence, and student competence. 61
The accreditation process involves a number of steps. First, the ac-
creditation agency determines the standards that must be met.6 2 Next,
the institutions of higher education seeking accreditation engage in a
self-study to measure their performance against the pre-set accredita-
tion standards.63 After the self-study, a team selected by the accredi-
tation agency performs an on-site evaluation of the institution to
determine whether the institution is meeting the accreditation stan-
corded an unaccredited public or private nonprofit institution that is progressing toward
accreditation within a reasonable period of time." Id.
56. See Federal Student Aid Forms, UNrfED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: FEDERAL
STUDENT Alo, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/forms.jsp (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2011).
57. Financial Aid for Postsecondary Students: Accreditation in the United States, UNrlFE
STATES DEPARTMENT OF, EDUCATION, http://www.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.
html#Overview (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
58. Id.
59. Majorie Webster Junior Coll., Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Coils. & Secondary Schs.,
Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
60. See Judith S. Eaton, An Overview of U.S. Accreditation 5 (Council for Higher Education
Accreditation Report 2009), available at http://www.chea.org/pdf/2009.06_Overview of USAc-
creditation.pdf.
61. See, e.g., Standards for Accreditation, New ENG. Ass'N OF SCHlS. AND) CoiiEos, http://
cihe.neasc.org/standards-policies/standards/standards html-version (last visited Jan. 15, 2011);
see also Eaton, supra note 60, at 2.
62. See Standards for Accreditation, supra note 61.
63. See Eaton, supra note 60, at 4.
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dards.M The accreditation agency will then publish a list of the institu-
tions it grants accreditation to.6 5 The accreditation agency then
continuously monitors the accredited institutions to ensure that the
institutions continue to meet the agency's standards. 66 Finally, the ac-
creditation agency performs periodic re-evaluation to ensure that the
institution continues to meet accreditation standards. 67
Accreditation may be granted to the institution as a whole (institu-
tional accreditation) or to individual programs or departments within
an institution (programmatic accreditation). 68 Accreditation or preac-
creditation status allows educational institutions to establish eligibility
to participate in the U.S. Department of Education federal student
financial assistance programs under Title IV of the HEA.69 The ac-
creditation process is very fact-specific and does not lend itself to
bright-line rules, but rather requires subjective evaluations and judg-
ments of the persons involved in the accreditation process. For that
reason, courts have typically given accreditation agency decisions
great deference. 70
D. History of FCA Actions Against Higher Educational Institutions
Prior to 2005, relators bringing FCA claims against colleges and uni-
versities were unsuccessful in cases in which the institution had not
made a false claim directly to the government in its PPA.71 For in-
stance, in United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educational Services, the
qui tam relators brought an FCA claim against ITT Educational Ser-
vices claiming that the school made a false claim to the government
through misstatements in its PPAs with the Department of Education,
which allowed it to receive Title IV funds that it otherwise would not
have qualified for.7 2 The relators were admissions and recruitment
representatives of the school who claimed to be paid under an "incen-
tive compensation" structure, which was a violation of federal law.7 3
The relators did not claim that the student's FAFSAs contained any
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2; see also Standards for Accreditation, supra note 61.
66. Eaton, supra note 60, at 5.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 2.
69. Id. at 3.
70. See, e.g., Ambrose v. New England Ass'n of Schs. & Coils., 252 F.3d 488, 495 (1st Cir.
2001).
71. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487 (S.D.
Tex. 2003); United States ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln Technical Inst., Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV505K,
2003 WL 22474586 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2003).
72. Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
73. Id. at 491.
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false certifications or that the school filed false applications for fund-
ing directly to the government. 7 4 The relators argued only that the
students were able to receive federal funding due to the school's certi-
fication in its PPA that it had complied with federal regulations.75 The
court, however, dismissed the action, finding that the relator's claim
was insufficient to establish liability under the FCA because there
could be no liability under the FCA unless the false certification was a
prerequisite to payment.76 The court recognized a "distinction be-
tween generally certifying compliance with applicable regulations and
statutes governing participation in a program, as opposed to certifying
compliance with a particular requirement that is a prerequisite to re-
ceiving or retaining payment under that program."77
That same year, a federal district court in Texas used the same rea-
soning as the Graves court to dismiss a qui tam FCA action against a
higher education institution for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.78 Similar to Graves, the relators in United
States ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln Technical Institute were the school's ad-
missions representatives who claimed to have been paid on a commis-
sion basis while the school participated in federal loan programs. 79
The relators contended that by executing PPAs with the Department
of Education, the school was representing that it was in compliance
with the regulations of the HEA even though it was violating the stat-
ute by paying the commission-based salary.80 The court, however, re-
jected the relators' theory, concluding that the they had failed to
establish that the school "made a false certification of compliance, ei-
ther implied or express, as a condition of payment."81 Therefore, the
relators had failed to allege that Lincoln made a false claim under the
FCA.82
In 2005, a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in United States
ex rel. Main v. Oakland City University marked a dramatic shift from
the rejection of the false certification theory by the courts in Graves
and Gay.83 In Main, the relator once again was a recruiter who
74. Id. at 490-91.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 501.
77. Id.
78. United States ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln Technical Inst., Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV505K, 2003 WL
22474586, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2003).
79. Id.
80. Id. at *3.
81. Id. at *4.
82. Id.
83. United States ex reL Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005).
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claimed he was paid on a contingent basis. 84 While the recruiter was
being paid on a contingent basis, the university was submitting appli-
cations to establish eligibility for federal funding under the HEA and
thus making misstatements because the school was in violation of the
HEA.85 The Seventh Circuit looked at the causal relationship be-
tween the false statement and payment from the government in the
form of student loans rather than the temporal relationship.86 The
court examined the student loan application process in phases, stating
that phase one consisted of the application to establish the institu-
tion's eligibility to receive federal funding (through the PPA), and
phase two consisted of the application for specific grants, loans, and
scholarships (in this case, the FAFSA).87
Prior to the Seventh Circuit's review, the district court had dis-
missed the relator's claim on the pleadings, holding that false state-
ments in the phase-one application did not violate the FCA because it
was simply a declaration of eligibility and not a request of payment
from the Treasury.88 This reasoning was in line with Graves and Gay.
The district court determined that the phase two applications, which
involved direct requests for payment of grants, loans, and scholar-
ships, were covered by the FCA, but in this case there was no viola-
tion of the FCA because the university did not state in the phase-two
application that it was complying with the rule against paying
recruiters on a contingent basis.89
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected this line of reasoning, hold-
ing that the university relied on its phase-one application when it
made a phase-two application for payment.90 The court reasoned that
the phase-two application contained a false claim because the school
represented that the student was enrolled in an institution eligible to
receive federal funding, which was not true due to violation of the
statute regarding contingent fee payments.91 The court stated that
when "a false statement is integral to a causal chain leading to pay-
ment, it is irrelevant how the federal bureaucracy has apportioned the
statements among layers of paperwork." 92
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Shortly after the Main decision, liability under the FCA was ex-
tended to include the false certifications made by a university during
the accreditation process. 93 In 2006, a the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California followed the two-tiered approach set out
by the Seventh Circuit in Main to deny Chapman University's motion
to dismiss a relator's FCA claim in United States v. Chapman Univer-
sity.9 4 Here, the relators alleged that the university falsely certified
that over the ten-year period preceding the filing of the lawsuit, the
university met the minimum clock-hour requirements for classroom
instruction in compliance with federal provisions.95 The relators
claimed that as a result of these false certifications, the university re-
ceived hundreds of millions of dollars in state and federal funding
through student scholarships, grants, and loans.96 Specifically, the re-
lators contended that the university, through its president, falsely cer-
tified in written reports to the regional accreditation agency that the
school was in compliance with the accreditation standards relating to
minimum-hour requirements in the Marriage and Family Therapist
(MFT) program, supervision of the MFT program, and adequate sup-
port for satellite campuses.97 These false certifications, the relators
alleged, led to regional accreditation that would otherwise not have
been granted.98 The regional accreditation, in turn, was a "material
and fundamental condition of payment of government funds for tui-
tion loan[s] and grants." 99
The university argued that the relators had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted because the PPAs themselves did
not contain "an affirmative certification of compliance with the [re-
gional] accreditation requirements."100 The university also tried to
differentiate the case from Main, stating that it had not violated any
statutory requirements for eligibility as had been done in Main.'0
The court, however, rejected this argument, finding it to be irrelevant
that the accreditation agency's standards did not have the force of a
statute.102 The court followed the Main decision and denied the
school's motion to dismiss the relator's claim, reasoning that the
93. See United States v. Chapman Univ., No. SACV 04-1256JVSRCX, 2006 WL 1562231, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2006).
94. Id.
95. Id. at *1.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *4.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *5.
100. Id. at *6.
101. See id. at *3.
102. Id
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school's false certifications to the accreditation agency were phase one
in the two-phase process of submitting a claim to the government for
funds, and therefore the allegations could not be dismissed merely be-
cause the relators did not allege government payment as a result of
false certifications to the accreditation agency. 103
That same year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also followed
the Seventh Circuit's Main decision, reversing the district court's grant
of the University of Phoenix's motion to dismiss the relator's claim in
United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix.104 This case
once again involved relators who were school enrollment counselors
claiming that they were paid on a contingent-fee basis in violation of
the incentive compensation ban required to receive Title IV funds. 05
The relators contended that the university violated the incentive-com-
pensation ban by compensating employees based directly on enroll-
ment activities and by trying to hide these activities by creating "fake"
employment records to provide to the Department of Education,
which contained performance reviews based on legitimate factors
rather than the quantitative factors actually used. 0 6 As with the
aforementioned cases, the relators contended that false claims were
made to the government via the PPAs that the university submitted to
establish eligibility for Title IV funding.107 The Ninth Circuit held that
the relators had properly stated a claim under the FCA because they
had properly alleged (1) a false statement (2) made with scienter (3)
that was material and (4) caused the government to pay money.108
The court concluded that the plaintiffs properly pled that the school
had made a false claim because the relators had alleged specific in-
stances of the university establishing policies violating the incentive-
ban requirement and knowingly encouraged employees to violate
it.'o, The court determined that the relators had properly alleged sci-
enter, the second element, because they claimed that the university
officials "openly bragged about perpetrating a fraud," developed a
system of keeping fake records to deceive the government, and re-
peatedly changed policies to cover the fraud.110 The court focused on
evaluating the materiality of the false statement and its relation to the
103. See id.
104. United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006).
105. Id. at 1169.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1169-70.
108. Id. at 1177-78.
109. Id. at 1175.
110. Id.
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government's decision to provide federal funding."' The court found
that the false statement was material because Title IV funding was
explicitly conditioned on compliance with the incentive compensation
ban found in the federal statute, federal regulation, and the PPA itself,
which stated that "[t]he execution of this Agreement [which contains
a reference to the incentive compensation ban] by the Institution and
the Secretary is a prerequisite to the Institution's initial or continued
participation in any Title IV, [federal loan] program." 11 2 While the
university argued that the ban was a condition of participation rather
than a condition of payment, the court rejected the distinction.113 As
to the fourth and final element-presentment to the government for
payment-the court referenced Main and wrote, "All that matters is
whether the false statement or course of conduct causes the govern-
ment to 'pay out money or to forfeit moneys due.'"114
E. The 2009 Federal False Claims Act Amendments
On May 20, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Fraud En-
forcement and Recovery Act (FERA).1' 5 The purpose of FERA is to
"improve enforcement of mortgage fraud, securities and commodities
fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds related to federal
assistance and relief programs, for the recovery of funds lost to these
frauds."116 FERA significantly expands the FCA. 17 First, the FCA
no longer requires that false claims for payment be made directly to
an officer or employee of the U.S. government or member of the U.S.
Armed Forces.1' 8 Additionally, the statute now has a revised "con-
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1175-76 (first two alterations in original) (quoting the school's PPA).
113. Id. at 1176.
114. Id. at 1177 (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 788 (4th
Cir. 1999)).
115. FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). A number of organizations have taken
a stance opposing FERA, including the Heritage Foundation, the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers, the American Council of Engineering Companies, the American Hospital
Association, the American Insurance Association, the Coalition for Government Procurement,
the Association of American Medical Colleges, TechAmerica, and the National Defense Indus-
trial Association. See S.386: FERA, GovTRACK.us: A Civic PROJECT TO TRACK CONGRESS,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=S111-386 (last visited Sept. 28, 2010). There are
no organizations that have taken a stance in support of FERA. Id.
116. § 1, 123 Stat. at 1617.
117. See id.
118. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2009). Before the amendments, the statute
imposed liability when any person "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer
or employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; [or] knowingly makes, uses, or causes
to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or ap-
proved by the government." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (amended). The amendments
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spiracy" provision.119 Previously, the statute imposed liability when a
party "conspire[d] to defraud the Government by getting a false or
fraudulent claim allowed or paid." 120 The amended statute, however,
removes the requirement that the conspiracy have the purpose of get-
ting a false claim paid or approved. 121 The current statute states that
liability may be imposed on a person who "conspires to commit a vio-
lation of [any part of the Act]."1 22
Perhaps an even more significant amendment is the removal of the
intent requirement in the submission of false claims to the govern-
ment. 123 The prior language of the statute required a person to
"knowingly make . . . a false record or statement to get a false or
fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government."124 The cur-
rent language, however, imposes liability when a person "knowingly
makes . . . a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent
claim." 125 "Material" is now defined in the statute as "having a natu-
ral tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or
receipt of money or property." 126 Thus, the amendments change the
focus of the inquiry from the purpose of the defendant's false certifi-
cations to the impact false statements have on the government's pay-
ment decision.127 This marks a drastic change in the analysis
employed by the Supreme Court in Allison Engine Co. v. United States
ex rel. Sanders, in which the Court limited the application of the FCA
to cases involving intent "to defraud the government." 28
F. Pending Bills
Currently, bills are pending in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate that could further expand a private citizen's ability to
bring a qui tam action under the FCA. The False Claims Act Clarifi-
cation Act of 2009 was introduced in the Senate on February 24,
removed the language relating to presenting a claim to a government official. 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B). The current statute thus reads "knowingly presents, or causes to be
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; [or] knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim."
Id.
119. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(C).
120. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (amended).
121. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(C).
122. Id.
123. See § 3729(a)(1)(B).
124. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (amended) (emphasis added).
125. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
126. § 3729(b)(4).
127. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (amended) (stating "to get" a false or fraudulent claim),
with 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (stating "material to" a false or fraudulent claim).
128. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672-73 (2008).
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2009.129 The False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009 was introduced
on March 30, 2009, in the House. 30 Few key provisions in each of
these bills would, if passed, substantially affect the future of FCA qui
tam actions against institutions of higher education.
House Bill 1788 would reduce the heightened pleading require-
ments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for claims of
fraud.131 Under current Rule 9(b), "the circumstances constituting
[the] fraud or mistake" must be set forth "with particularity."13 2 The
purpose of the heightened pleading requirement is to ensure that the
defendant has enough information to be put on notice of the miscon-
duct and formulate a defense.133 Hence, when a plaintiff alleges
fraud, "mere conclusory allegations of fraud are insufficient." 1 3 4
However, House Bill 1788 seeks to change the general fraud pleading
requirements by providing that when a party brings a qui tam action,
the relator will not have to identify specific claims that resulted from
the alleged misconduct "if the allegations in the pleading provide ade-
quate notice of the specific nature of the alleged misconduct to permit
the Government effectively to investigate and defendants fairly to de-
fend the allegations made." 135 Thus, if passed, this bill would drasti-
cally reduce the procedural hurdles that FCA qui tam relators
currently face by allowing relators to plead fraud generally without
specific knowledge of a precise instance of fraudulent behavior.
Both the Senate and House bills also propose to eliminate a defen-
dant's ability to raise a defense when there has been public disclosure
of the false claim or when the relator is not the "original source" of
the information, as is currently required under the FCA to bring a qui
tam action. 136 "Original source" is currently defined in the FCA as
129. False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009, S. 458, 111th Cong. 1 (seeking to amend the
Federal False Claims Act).
130. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009, H.R. 1788, 111th Cong. 1. The bill seeks to
"amend the provisions of title 31, United States Code, relating to false claims to clarify and make
technical amendments to those provisions." Id.
131. Fi. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
132. Id.
133. See United States v. Chapman Univ., No. SAVC 04-1256JVSRCX, 2006 WL 1562231, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. May 23,2006) (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir.
2003)).
134. Id. (citing Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989)).
135. H.R. 1788.
136. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West 2009). The statute reads,
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in
a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, au-
dit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attor-
ney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
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"an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the in-
formation on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily pro-
vided the information to the Government before filing an action
under this section which is based on the information."13 7 The House
bill, however, removes language about an original source and states
instead that an action will be dismissed only when "allegations relat-
ing to all essential elements of liability of the action or claim are based
exclusively on the public disclosure." 38 Further, the bill states that
"[a]n action or claim is 'based on' a public disclosure only if the per-
son bringing the action derived the person's knowledge of all essential
elements of liability of the action or claim alleged in the complaint
from the public disclosure."139 The Senate bill also seeks to remove
the "original source" language, stating instead that an action will be
dismissed when substantially the same matters as alleged in the action
or complaint were contained in various public disclosures. 140 Addi-
tionally, the bill states that an action may be dismissed when
[alny new information provided by the person does not add sub-
stantial grounds for additional recovery beyond those encompassed
within the Government's existing criminal indictment or informa-
tion, or an open and active criminal, civil, or administrative investi-
gation or audit; and . . . the Government's existing .. . investigation
was not initiated or published after the Government's receipt of in-
formation about substantially the same matters voluntarily brought
by the person to the Government.141
Thus, under each bill the relator would still be prevented from bring-
ing an action based on claims that have already been disclosed to the
government but would have the ability to bring a claim under the
FCA when the relator is not the "original source" of the information.
This would expand the number of potential relators with the ability to
bring FCA actions against institutions of higher education.
Id.
137. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
138. H.R. 1788.
139. Id.
140. False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009, S. 458, 111th Cong. Specifically, the allega-
tions cannot be based upon
(i) a filed criminal indictment or information, or an open and active criminal, civil, or
administrative investigation or audit; or (ii) a news media report, or public congres-
sional hearing, report, or investigation, if within 90 days after the issuance or comple-
tion of such news media report or congressional hearing, report, or investigation, the
Department of Justice or an Office of Inspector General opened a fraud investigation
or audit of the facts contained in such news media report or congressional hearing,
report, or investigation as a result of learning about the public report . . ..
Id.
141. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
There is little doubt that the 2009 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act (FERA) has significantly expanded liability under the FCA.142
While the intention of FERA was to protect the government against
fraud associated with the Troubled Asset Relief Program funds and
the economic stimulus package,143 FERA ignores the undesired con-
sequences that such a dramatic expansion of liability under the FCA
may have on higher education institutions. Institutions of higher edu-
cation are decentralized, making it difficult, if not impossible, for one
party to monitor all of the programs and activities within the organiza-
tion.' 4 The accreditation process for institutions of higher education
thus requires a high degree of specialized determinations rather than
black and white judgments based on these numerous activities and
programs within the institution.145 Educational institutions must
promise the accreditation agencies that the school is complying with
the agency's standards.146 The expansion of the scope of FCA liabil-
ity, the large number of programs offered at universities, the individu-
alized nature of the accreditation process, and the growing number of
plaintiffs' attorneys actively recruiting "whistle-blowers to pursue
FCA claims" create a higher risk that institutions of higher education
will be subject to a growing number of FCA claims, regardless of
whether the claims have merit.147
Section A of this analysis discusses how the reasoning employed by
the courts in Graves"48 and Gay,149 in which the courts granted the
defendant schools' motions to dismiss, was in line with the ultimate
142. The recent amendments have drawn a significant amount of attention and commentary
about the expansion of FCA liability. See, e.g., New Compliance Challenges: False Claims Act
Amendments-FERA with More Pending, The MiETROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, July 22,
2009, at 22 ( "[Any business that is directly or indirectly the recipient of federal money may now
be exposed to qui tam actions as a result of FERA. Although well intentioned, it opens the door
for disgruntled employees and disappointed competitors to bring qui tam actions." (quoting
Sheryl J. Willert, managing director and member of Williams Kastner)).
143. Id.
144. Braceras & Bell, supra note 28, at 8-3.3 ("A university may have dozens, if not hundreds,
of separate departments, professors, or students engaged in federally funded projects at any
given time, and each such project presents a potential FCA claim. A university's difficulty in
managing such projects, however, is no excuse or defense to an FCA lawsuit.").
145. See ACE Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 14-15.
146. See Commission on Institutes of Higher Education: New England Association of Schools
and Colleges, Standards for Accreditation 2 (2005), available at http://cihe.neasc.org/stan-
dards-polic ies/standards (noting that institutions have to engage in a self-review process di-
rected toward demonstrating that they meet the accreditation agency's standards, and that such
process requires an "honest and forthright assessment of institutional strengths and
weaknesses").
147. Braceras & Bell, supra note 28, at 8-33.
148. United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
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goal of the FCA. 5 0 Section B discusses how the reasoning employed
by the courts in Main,151 Hendow,152 and Chapman,53 in which the
courts denied the defendant schools' motions to dismiss, was inappro-
priate because it ignored the original purpose of the FCA.154 Section
C discusses how FERA, when applied to institutions of higher educa-
tion, will have potentially disastrous consequences because the legisla-
tion will open a floodgate of litigation related to promises institutions
make as part of the accreditation process and will ultimately benefit
relators more than it will help the government combat fraud.155 Sec-
tion D discusses how the proposed FCA legislation will lead to a fur-
ther increase in litigation and cost institutions of higher education a
significant amount of money to either defend or settle these claims.156
A. The Courts Had It Right in Graves and Gay
The FCA was intended to "combat and to deter fraud."157 When
the FCA was amended in 1986, Congress wanted to ensure a "coordi-
nated effort" between the government and private citizens acting as
relators, to protect the U.S. Treasury and "enhance the Government's
ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Gov-
ernment."1 58 However, the Supreme Court has stated that "the False
Claims Act was not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced on
the government."15 9
Since the 1986 amendments, the number of FCA actions initiated
by qui tam relators has grown dramatically.160 The increase in relator-
initiated FCA claims is the result of lower hurdles for qui tam relators
149. United States ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln Technical Inst., No. Civ.A. 301CV505K, 2003 WL
22474586 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2003).
150. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
151. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2005).
152. United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
153. United States v. Chapman Univ., No. SAVC 04-1256JVSRCX, 2006 WL 1562231 (C.D.
Cal. May 23, 2006).
154. See infra notes 165-80 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
157. United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 302 F.3d 637, 645 (6th Cir. 2002).
158. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67.
159. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
160. Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, The 1986 False Claims Act Amendments: A
Retrospective Look at Twenty Years of Effective Fraud Fighting in America, at 6, available at
http://www.taf.org/retrospective.pdf ("While the total number of new FCA actions has remained
relatively constant (e.g., 427 in 1987, 513 in 1995, 494 in 2005), there has been a significant shift
from government-filed suits to whistleblower-filed suits. Only 15% of all new FCA actions filed
in 1987 were whistleblower suits. . . . [In 2005], nearly 80% of all new FCA actions were filed by
whistleblowers.").
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as well as greater incentives to bring FCA claims. While the increase
in litigation following the 1986 amendments allowed the government
to recover a significant amount of money, 161 it is important for the
government to ensure that these recoveries serve to punish only those
institutions that have profited from defrauding the government. The
decisions in both Graves and Gay enforced this principle by refusing
to impose FCA liability when there was no false statement made di-
rectly to the government to obtain federal funding.
The line of reasoning in both Graves and Gay correctly took into
account the importance of requiring a false certification as a condition
of payment. 162 By requiring that the false certification directly relate
to the government's decision to make a payment, these courts refused
to expand the reach of the FCA when the relationship between the
false certification and payment was too attenuated.163 Furthermore,
requiring a proximate relationship between the alleged false claim and
payment from the federal government is appropriate because it en-
sures that liability under the FCA only applies to cases that the statute
was originally intended to reach. While "but for" the alleged misstate-
ment, the schools in both Gay and Graves had a possibility of not
being eligible to receive federal financial aid funding, it would have
been inappropriate for the courts to automatically assume that the al-
leged misstatements made the institutions wholly ineligible for the
federal funds. The effect of these decisions therefore did not encroach
on the authority of administrative agencies, such as accreditation
agencies, to make judgments based on their own experience and ex-
pertise.164 Accordingly, these courts correctly refused to impose a
bright-line rule that any misstatement in a PPA would constitute a
false claim under the FCA. Imposing such a bright-line standard
would do little to further the FCA's goals of combating and deterring
fraud against the federal government. An institution making immate-
161. Id. at 7 ("[Tlhe total yearly recoveries have dramatically increased, jumping from an
average of $368 million from 1987 to 1996, to an average of over $1.25 billion from 1997 to
2005."). The largest FCA settlements have ranged from $26 million (Conoco Inc. in March of
2000) to $1 billion (Pfizer in September of 2009). See Top False Claims Act Cases by Award
Amount, TAXPAYERs AGAINsr FRAUD EDUCATION FUND, http://www.taf.org/toploofca.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
162. See United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487, 500 (S.D. Tex.
2003); see also United States ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln Technical Inst., No. Civ.A. 301 CV505K, 2003
WL 22474586, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2003).
163. See Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 500; see also Gay, 2003 WL 22474586, at *4.
164. See Braceras & Bell, supra note 28, at 8-30 (citing Athol Mem'l Hosp. v. Comm'r of the
Div. of Med. Assistance, 772 N.E.2d 569, 574 n.9 (Mass. 2002) ("The doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion precludes judicial consideration of a matter where administrative proceedings have not yet
begun.")).
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rial misstatements on its PPA is unquestionably distinguishable from a
contractor selling the government faulty goods at outrageous prices.
B. The Courts Had It Wrong in Main, Hendow, and Chapman
When Main, Hendow, and Chapman were decided, the courts began
significantly expanding FCA liability in order to cover claims that ar-
guably were never intended to be covered by the FCA. 165 After these
decisions, in fact, many courts rejected the reasoning employed by the
Main, Hendow, and Chapman courts and continued to require a sig-
nificant causal relationship between the false certification and the pay-
ment claim.166 By greatly expanding the scope of the FCA, these
decisions "expose[d] postsecondary institutions to crushing financial
liability under the FCA for any knowing violation of any Title IV stat-
ute or regulation, no matter how minor or technical the violation." 67
Expanding the reach of the FCA will result in educational institutions
expending a lot of money to defend qui tam actions whether or not
they are meritorious. 168
These decisions also open the door for FCA claims based on a
knowing violation of any number of regulatory requirements "no mat-
ter how perfunctory or minor" so long as the violation involves a con-
dition of eligibility to obtain federal funding.169 This exposes
165. See id. ("[Wihile perhaps well-intentioned, the expansion of FCA liability to representa-
tions made by schools during the accreditation or participation process is an unnecessary intru-
sion into the affairs of universities. Universities do not need further monitoring and regulation
of their internal affairs through the FCA.").
166. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gross v. AIDS Research Alliance-Chi., 415 F.3d 601, 605
(7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the certification must be "a condition of payment of government
money" in order to be actionable); United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg'1 Health Ctr., Inc.,
459 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1086 (D. Kan. 2006) ("A legally false certification of compliance with a
statute or regulation cannot form a viable FCA cause of action unless payment is expressly con-
ditioned on that certification."); United States ex rel. Rocha v. Am. Transitional Hosps., Inc., No.
H-97-2699, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38892, at *17 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2005) (declaring that the
relators had alleged that the defendants made certifications of compliance with particular regula-
tions on which payment was conditioned).
167. Brief for the Career College Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2,
Univ. of Phx. v. United States ex rel. Hendow, 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-1006), 2007
WL 935020 [hereinafter CCA Amicus Brief].
168. Id. at 3 ("Because this potential for draconian FCA liability far exceeds the ability of
even the largest school, college, or university to withstand, the Ninth Circuit's holding [in
Hendow] creates tremendous pressure to expend exorbitant sums to either dispute or settle mer-
itless claims based on a so-called condition of eligibility."). It is further noted that
the courts of appeal are irreconcilably split as to whether FCA liability attaches when
an alleged false statement is made in connection with a so-called condition of eligibility,
rather than a condition of payment. The lack of a uniform interpretation of the reach
of FCA liability creates an intolerable state of affairs . . ..
Id.
169. Id. at 6.
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institutions of higher education to tremendous liability for something
that could be a very insubstantial and inconsequential violation of an
applicable regulatory requirement.o70
While many scholars have feared that these decisions will lead to a
floodgate of litigation, some have argued that this is an overreac-
tion.171 One scholar rejecting the arguments of critics of the Main,
Chapman, and Hendow cases notes that critics overlook the crucial
fact that only fraudulent behavior exposes institutions of higher edu-
cation to FCA liability.172 Another skeptic of the critics of the reason-
ing in Main, Chapman, and Hendow notes that "[FCA liability]
applies only where there is a material breach of a condition of pay-
ment, and it's flagrant." 73 He elaborates that "[t]he only colleges that
face trouble are those that are not obeying the law and the material
accreditation standards that underlie their getting loans and
grants." 74
These arguments, while perhaps persuasive before the passage of
FERA, are no longer applicable because they hinge on the distinction
between "broken promises and intentional fraud."175 FERA removed
the language requiring claims to be made "to get a false or fraudulent
claim paid" 76 and instead requires only that the false statement have
the "natural tendency to influence the payment or receipt of
money."' 77 The revised statute no longer focuses on the intent to de-
fraud the government, and therefore this line of reasoning suggesting
that there will not be a floodgate of litigation, while perhaps previ-
ously persuasive, is no longer a reasonable argument.
Aside from the expansion of FCA liability and the potential flood
of new litigation as a result of these decisions, the decisions also im-
pose a black-and-white standard for determining whether or not an
170. See id.
171. See Perkins, supra note 15, at 765 ("Critics of the Main ruling are concerned that there
will be a drastic increase in the number of frivolous FCA suits against colleges and universi-
ties."). Perkins additionally notes that these same critics warned of a "break down [of] commu-
nication lines between federal agencies and the colleges and universities." Id.
172. Id. at 768.
173. Id. at 768-69 (quoting Doug Lederman, Ever-Expanding False Claims Act, INsiE
HIGHER ED. (May 26, 2006), http://www.insidehighereducation.com/news/2006/05/26/false).
174. Id. at 769.
175. Id. ("[Clourts have been distinguishing between broken promises and intentional fraud,
and it is reasonable to expect them to do so in the future. FCA liability will attach only when the
institution knew it was lying to the government about its past behavior or current intentions in
order to get federal money. The primary effect of Main was to hold private institutions of higher
learning as accountable as other groups that get federal financial support.").
176. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006) (amended).
177. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(b)(4) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
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institution is eligible to receive federal funding.178 The Secretary of
Education "is expressly charged in the statutory scheme with deter-
mining eligibility."17 9 When the Secretary has determined that an in-
stitution is not eligible to receive federal funding, the Secretary should
be afforded great discretion regarding what action to take. 80 The re-
sult of these three decisions thus sets up bright-line standards and im-
poses significant liability on educational institutions for potentially
insignificant misstatements relating to Title IV eligibility. For in-
stance, the Secretary could still determine that an institution should be
accredited even with the false statement, but the court takes this deci-
sion out of the Secretary's hands and imposes liability. The bright-line
rules coupled with the removal of the Secretary's power of discretion-
ary judgment places institutions of higher education in a position
where they are at risk for FCA qui tam litigation in a wide range of
circumstances with little chance of getting the claims dismissed. The
FCA was originally intended to punish those who committed fraud
against the government, but educational institutions are generally not-
for-profit entities and therefore are not profiting from submitting false
claims to the government. If found liable under the FCA, these insti-
tutions could face bankruptcy, which would primarily hurt the stu-
dents who attend these institutions. Thus, the bright-line liability
created by these decisions moves away from the original intent of the
FCA and causes innocent parties to suffer the consequences of any
false statement made relating to institutional eligibility to receive Title
IV funding.
178. CCA Amicus Brief, supra note 167, at 12. This brief notes that under the Medicare
statute, there are certain provisions that expressly prohibit payment in certain circumstances, but
that such provisions are not present in the Higher Education Act. Id. It is also noted that the
federal regulations specifically prescribe the secretary's discretion in eligibility matters. See 34
C.F.R. § 600.41(a) (2008) (noting that "[i]f the Secretary believes that a previously designated
eligible institution as a whole, or at one or more of its locations, does not satisfy the statutory or
regulatory requirements that define that institution as an eligible institution, the Secretary may"
take one or more of the various administrative actions against the institution delineated).
179. Sistema Universitario Ana G. Mendez v. Riley, 234 F.3d 772, 779 (1st Cir. 2000).
180. Id. (Secretary held that "'in accordance with my discretionary authority' College would
not be required to pay back any Title IV funds disbursed to students in an ineligible program.");
In re Mary Holmes Coll., Dkt. No. 94-32-SP, U.S. Dep't of Ed. (March 30, 1995) (Certified as
Final Decision by the Secretary Sept. 18, 1995) ("When violation of Title IV is deemed only
technical in nature, the extreme remedy of declaring the program to be ineligible is unwarranted,
absent other aggravating circumstances.").
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C. FERA Will Allow Courts to Inappropriately Step into the
Shoes of Accreditation Agencies
FERA has now essentially eliminated the need for courts to engage
in the two-tiered inquiry first introduced by the Seventh Circuit in
Main, as the statute no longer requires that a claim be presented "to
an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member
of the Armed Forces of the United States."s'8 The revised statute
now only requires that the party make a false statement and that the
natural consequence of such a statement is payment by the govern-
ment. 182 As numerous promises are made by educational institutions
to accreditation agencies, there is a great opportunity for qui tam rela-
tors to bring FCA claims against educational institutions related to
such statements. Holding educational institutions liable under the
FCA for these statements, however, would improperly substitute the
court's bright-line standard for the judgment of the accreditation
agency.
Courts should not second-guess an accreditor's judgment because
they are not equipped to stand in the shoes of an accreditation
agency. 83 Accordingly, in the past, courts have typically given great
deference to educational judgments. 184 One of the most important
educational judgments that courts should give deference to is accredi-
tation decisions. 85 Courts simply do not have the capability to make
the highly individualized and fact-specific accreditation decisions
made by accreditation agencies.'86 Courts themselves have recog-
nized that accrediting agencies "are better suited than are courts to
181. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006) (amended).
182. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(b)(4) (West 2009).
183. See ACE Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 3 ("To subject the accreditation of colleges and
universities to judicial reconstruction would conflict with courts' recognition that accreditation in
higher education entails paradigmatic educational judgment."); see also Braceras & Bell, supra
note 28, at 8-30 ("Courts and qui tam relators simply do not have the expertise, experience, or
discretion to monitor and enforce collegiate rules and regulations.").
184. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: "A Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99
YAuE L.J. 251, 323 (1989) ("Yet the consistency of result and invocation of the need for judicial
restraint whenever internal university decisions are challenged by an unhappy student or profes-
sor has been sufficiently impressive that a competent practitioner today would advise such a
student or professor that her chances of success are low or nil.").
185. See ACE Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 10.
"A certain amount of flexibility in fashioning accrediting standards long has been rec-
ognized as a virtue . . . . This makes perfect sense: after all, benchmarks for accredita-
tion are not intended as reference points for laymen. To the contrary, their raison
d'etre is to guide professionals in a particular field of endeavor (here, education)."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ambrose v. New England Ass'n of Schs. & Colls., Inc., 252
F.3d 488, 499 (1st Cir. 2001)).
186. See id. at 9.
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evaluate the effectiveness of a residency program."187 Furthermore,
courts have not required accrediting agencies to maintain strict stan-
dards in the accreditation process. 88
As previously discussed, the accreditation process involves several
steps: (1) the accreditation agency sets standards for accreditation; (2)
the institution seeking accreditation performs a self-study to measure
its performance against the accreditation standards; (3) a team se-
lected by the accreditation agency performs an on-site evaluation to
determine if the institution is meeting accreditation standards; (4) the
accreditation agency publishes a list of accredited institutions in an
official publication; (5) the accreditation agency monitors the accred-
ited schools to ensure that the institution continues to meet the
agency's standards; and (6) the accreditation agency conducts a peri-
odic re-evaluation to ensure that the institution has continued to meet
accreditation standards.' 89 Furthermore, the types of higher educa-
tion institutions in the United States are numerous, spanning from
small liberal arts colleges to specialized schools and institutions.'90 In
order to accommodate the wide range of institutions and programs
offered by schools, higher education accreditation is decentralized and
diverse.191 Accreditation agencies are charged with reviewing an edu-
cational institution's performance on critical matters such as "faculty
composition ('who may teach'), curricula ('what may be taught'),
modes of instruction ('how it shall be taught'), and composition of the
student body ('who may be admitted to study')."192 Accreditation de-
cisions, therefore, require the judgment of individuals trained for the
task.193 Court decisions such as Chapman impose an unworkable
bright-line standard for accreditation due to the number of individual-
187. Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111, 119-20 (Conn. 1996); see also Cruz
Berrios v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., 218 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143-44 (D.P.R.
2002).
188. See Med. Inst. of Minn. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Trade & Technical Schs., 817 F.2d 1310, 1314
(8th Cir. 1987) ("Strict guidelines would strip from [accrediting agency] officials the discretion
necessary to adequately assess the multitude of variables presented by different schools."); see
also Parsons Coll. v. N. Cent. Ass'n of Colls. & Secondary Schs., 271 F. Supp. 65, 73 (N.D. Ill.
1967) (noting that accreditation standards "are not guides for the layman but for professionals in
the field of education. Definiteness may prove, in another view, to be arbitrariness.").
189. Accreditation in the United States, UNITED STAIrs DEPARTMEWF oF EoucAIoN, http://
www.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.html#Overview (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
190. See ACE Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 6.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 8.
193. See Wilfred Acad. of Hair & Beauty Culture v. S. Ass'n of Colls. & Schs., 957 F.2d 210,
214 (5th Cir. 1992); Med. Inst. of Minn. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Trade & Technical Schs., 817 F.2d 1310,
1314 (8th Cir. 1987); Parsons Coll. v. N. Cent. Ass'n of Colls. & Secondary Schs., 271 F. Supp. 65,
73 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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ized judgments accreditation agencies make. Holding an educational
institution liable under the FCA for statements made to accreditation
agencies is essentially equivalent to courts determining that these in-
stitutions are not accredited. By imposing FCA liability on universi-
ties based on claims made to accreditation agencies, the courts would
essentially be "supplant[ing] the remedies already provided for ac-
creditation or regulatory noncompliance." 194
Although accreditation agencies do have various standards that uni-
versities must meet in order to obtain accreditation, it would not be
accurate to state that any form of noncompliance with accreditation
standards would lead an accreditation agency to revoke the accredited
status of a university. Leaving accreditation decisions to the appropri-
ate agencies is essential to academic freedom.195 While courts have
traditionally recognized that agencies should be given deference to
make their own decisions, it is unclear if courts will eventually find the
same in this context because no case has yet been decided on its
merits.196
D. The Proposed Legislation Will Create Disastrous Consequences
for Educational Institutions
The proposed amendments to the FCA will undoubtedly allow
many more claims against colleges and universities to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss,197 whether or not such claims are meritorious. Re-
moving the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that
requires fraud be pled with particularity will likely encourage individ-
194. Braceras & Bell, supra note 28, at 8-30.
195. See ACE Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 8.
196. Of the cases previously discussed, which held that universities could face potential FCA
liability even though they did not directly present a claim for payment to the government, United
States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City University was settled in July of 2007 for $5.3 million, with
$1.4 million of the settlement going to the qui tam relator. See Oakland City Will Pay Multi-
Million Dollar Fine, CouiiRt PRESs ONINE (July 30, 2007, 6:43 PM), http://www.courierpress.
com/news/2007/jul/30/oakland-city-will-pay-multi-million-dollar-fine/. In United States v. Chap-
man University, the district court granted summary judgment in Chapman's favor in 2007. No.
SACV 0401256, 2007 WL 5998110 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2007). On appeal, the case was dismissed
without a decision due to the timeline for appeal of FCA decisions. See Chapman University
Accreditation Case Dismissed, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION (June 23,2009), http://www.
acenet.edu/AM/Template.cfm?Section=home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CON
TENTID=32973. Finally, in United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix, the Supreme
Court denied the university's petition for certiorari on April 23, 2007. 550 U.S. 903, 903 (2007).
The trial court then denied the university's motion to dismiss on May 18, 2009. Id. Finally, on
September 30, 2009, the university and the plaintiffs filed a joint request for stay of all proceed-
ings. Id. It remains to be seen what the ultimate outcome will be when cases presenting similar
issues to these three cases are decided on their merits.
197. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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uals to engage in "fishing expeditions," filing claims against universi-
ties absent actual knowledge of a precise instance of fraud. 98 Qui
tam relators could thus plead the alleged fraud generally, and hope to
find enough information via the discovery process to proceed with the
case or compel the institution to settle the case.199 This will force edu-
cational institutions to expend funds defending or settling what could
be completely non-meritorious claims.
The removal of the requirements of Rule 9(b) coupled with the re-
moval of the requirement that the relator be the "original source" of
the information 200 provides an incredible opportunity for FCA qui
tam actions to survive a motion to dismiss. 20 1 Additionally, given the
current state of the economy, many more people may find FCA qui
tam actions an attractive option due to the large rewards and insub-
stantial bar to bringing an FCA claim against an institution. 202
Unfortunately, the natural consequence of these proposed amend-
ments is to create an opportunity for individuals to bring frivolous
FCA claims against various institutions, forcing institutions to waste
both time and resources to defend them. With the number of
promises made by educational institutions to accreditation agencies
via PPAs between the school and the Department of Education, there
are numerous possible FCA claims for potential relators to bring, and
a flood of litigation against educational institutions would be an inevi-
table consequence.
IV. IMPACT
Universities will likely face a dramatic increase in FCA litigation
relating to the accreditation process. As intent to defraud the govern-
ment is no longer necessary for an FCA action,203 it will be much eas-
ier for qui tam relators to bring a claim against an institution for a
misrepresentation made during the accreditation process. The num-
ber of promises an institution makes during the accreditation process
allows for many instances in which an institution may make an imma-
terial mistake that is inconsequential to whether it would receive ac-
198. See, e.g., New Compliance Challenges, supra note 142, at 22 ("Relators will hope to ob-
tain through discovery either enough facts to proceed with the case or to achieve a settlement
based on the defendant's desire to avoid the costs of discovery.").
199. Id.
200. See S. 458, 111th Cong. (2009); see also H.R. 1788, 111th Cong. (2009).
201. See New Compliance Challenges, supra note 142.
202. Id.
203. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(b)(4) (West 2009). The statute now only requires that the
statement have a natural tendency to influence the payment or receipt of money or property
from the government. Id.
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creditation. For instance, an accreditation agency may have a
requirement imposing an obligation on an institution to file reports
regarding athletic-related student financial aid by July 1 every year as
a condition of eligibility.204 If the institution then executed its PPA
on, for instance, June 1, knowing that these reports would not in fact
be filed by the July 1 deadline, the institution could be at risk for an
FCA claim.205  Such a violation could lead to damages equal to,
double, or triple all of the Title IV aid it disbursed, which would be
hundreds of millions of dollars for some higher education institutions,
or even billions for others.206 Penalties of this size have the potential
to bankrupt even the largest universities. When viewed in this light, it
becomes apparent that colleges and universities may be at risk for a
party such as a disgruntled employee or student to bring an FCA ac-
tion against the institution for something that has no bearing on the
quality of the organization as an educational institution. Moreover,
these immaterial types of misstatements to an accreditation agency
would be unlikely to result in an accreditation agency revoking a uni-
versity's accredited status. Essentially, the FCA will allow parties to
bring an action against an educational institution for a matter that
would not result in the institution losing accreditation status but will
still cause the institution to incur extensive costs in defending, settling,
or paying a judgment on an FCA claim.
The increase in litigation will in turn lead to increased costs to uni-
versities in order to defend or settle FCA claims. Universities that are
already operating on a tight financial structure 207 will have to bear the
costs of FCA litigation, much of which is likely to be without merit.
Universities will thus need to pass these costs off somehow, and will
likely increase tuition rates in order to cover such expenses. Because
most students require federal financial assistance to cover the costs to
attend college,208 the increased tuition rates will lead to students tak-
ing out more federal funding to finance the cost of their education.
204. CCA Amicus Brief, supra note 167, at 9.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Kevin Dougherty, Financing Higher Education in the United States: Structure,
Trends, and Issues 7 (unpublished address 2004), available at http://www.tc.columbia.edu/centers/
coc e/pdf files/c9.pdf. The primary sources of financing of nonprofit institutions of higher educa-
tion are tuition (19% for public, 30% for private), federal government (11% for public, 10% for
private), state government (36% for public, 1% for private), sales and services (22% for public,
17% for private), and private gifts and grants (5% for public, 15% for private). Id.
208. See Fast Facts, IEs NATIONAL CENITER FOR EDUCATION STATISTIcs, http://nces.ed.gov/
fastfacts/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (noting that 47% percent of undergraduate students received
federal student financial aid in the school year 2007-08). It is also noted that 66% of all under-
graduate students received some sort of financial aid to finance their education in 2007-08. Id.
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This places a huge burden on the students when it comes to repay-
ment, especially given the current state of the economy, which has left
many students without employment and defaulting on their student
loans.209 In fiscal year 2007, the national default rate on federally
guaranteed student loans was 6.7%,210 the highest rate of default since
1998.211 Similar results were seen in the private loan sector for stu-
dent loans in fiscal year 2007.212 This situation adversely affects the
government, educational institutions, students, and student financial
aid lenders alike. The trickle-down effect of FCA litigation will thus
adversely affect innocent parties, as well as the U.S. government itself,
which is ultimately the party that the FCA was intended to protect.
All of this is evidenced by the recent settlement in the Hendow
case.213 The University of Phoenix settled its FCA lawsuit for $67.5
million, with $19 million going to the qui tam relators. 214 Although
the University of Phoenix is a for-profit institution, this is nevertheless
a very large settlement for an educational institution to bear. How the
university handles this cost remains to be seen, but this case serves as
an example of the extraordinary amount of money that universities
may be at risk of losing when faced with FCA claims.
Furthermore, if the proposed amendments to the FCA become law,
there will be a vast increase in "fishing expeditions" in which a relator
can state a generalized claim of fraud and hope to find something dur-
ing the discovery process.215 The increased litigation from fishing ex-
peditions will place an additional financial burden on institutions of
higher education that will have to settle or defend these claims. Once
again, these costs will need to be pushed down to the students and the
same cycle will continue to occur in which the government is ulti-
mately worse off from the FCA claims due to an increased amount of
loans and corresponding increase in default rates.
209. See Anne Marie Chaker, Student Loans: Default Rates Are Soaring, WALL ST. J. ONLINE
(Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027600001437467.html ("Defaults
on student loans are skyrocketing amid a weak job market for graduates and steadily rising
tuition costs.").
210. Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools, UNrmo STATEs DEIARnME NT OF EDUCATION:
FEDERAL STUDENT Amu, http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2011).
211. Chaker, supra note 209.
212. Id.
213. See University of Phoenix Settles False Claims Act Lawsuit for $67.5 Million, PR NE-w
SWIRE, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/university-of-phoenix-settles-false-claims-act-
lawsuit-for-675-million-79320372.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
214. Id.
215. New Compliance Challenges, supra note 142, at 22.
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The complexity of the accreditation process and the broad reach of
the FCA will ultimately entice private parties to bring qui tam actions
against educational institutions. These FCA actions will in turn affect
the students who attend the universities as well as government and
private lenders of student financial aid. The government will have to
pay out more money in federal student financial aid with a greater risk
that it will not be repaid. If successful, the qui tam relator and the
plaintiff's attorney will be the only parties that truly benefit from
these qui tam actions.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal False Claims Act was enacted in order to combat and
deter fraud against the federal government,216 and the qui tam provi-
sion of the FCA has assisted the government in recovering billions of
dollars.217 While originally intended to punish parties who profited
from defrauding the government,218 recent court interpretations and
legislative expansion of the FCA have expanded the reach of the stat-
ute in a manner that will ultimately benefit only one party in the edu-
cational institution context: the qui tam relator. The monetary
incentive to bring a qui tam action 219 as well as the decrease in proce-
dural hurdles for a qui tam relator to bring an FCA action caused by
these court interpretations220 and FCA amendments221 will likely re-
sult in a drastic increase in qui tam litigation against institutions of
higher education.
Educational institutions will become a target for FCA litigation es-
pecially in the area of accreditation because of the complex and spe-
cific nature of the accreditation process. The number of promises that
an educational institution makes to an accreditation agency has the
potential to give a qui tam relator numerous opportunities to bring an
FCA action against the institution for those promises that go unful-
filled, no matter how inconsequential they are. The increase in litiga-
tion will defeat the overall purpose of the FCA because it will result in
higher costs to educational institutions to defend or settle the FCA
claims, and these costs will ultimately have to be passed on to the
students in the form of higher tuition rates. Higher tuition rates will
216. United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 302 F.3d 637, 645 (6th Cir. 2002).
217. Braceras & Bell, supra note 28, at 8-6.
218. Perkins, supra note 15, at 747.
219. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(1)-(2) (West 2009).
220. See United States ex reL Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Chap-
man Univ., No. SAVC 04-1256JVSRCX, 2006 WL 1562231 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2006).
221. See False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
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ultimately lead these students to have to take out a larger amount of
federal loan money in order to cover the cost of increased tuition.
Higher loan amounts in turn increase the risk of default, causing huge
losses to the government.
The increased litigation also has the possibility of bankrupting edu-
cational institutions if found guilty of violating the FCA because the
institution would have to pay out three times the amount of money it
distributed to its students in the form of federal financial aid.222 Ulti-
mately, educational institutions and the students who attend them will
be the parties to suffer from an increase in FCA litigation, and the qui
tam relator will be the sole party to benefit, which is not the goal of
the FCA.
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